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ABSTRACT
This article examines how the availability of annuities affects
savings and inequality in economies in which neither private nor public
pensions initially exist. The absence of widespread market or government
annuity insurance is clearly descriptive of many less developed countries
in the world today; it was also a characteristic of virtually all countries
prior to World War II. The paper compares economies with perfect insurance
with economies in which completely selfish parents and children pool longev-
ity risk to their mutual advantage. The analysis of the latter economies
takes into account the infinite sequence of risk sharing bargains of suc-
cessive parents with their children. Such bargains affect current risk
sharing between parents and child because they determine the welfare of
current children when they become parents. Calculations based on the CBS
utility function indicate that perfecting annuity insurance can signifi-
cantly reduce national savings. Indeed, the insurance aspects of govern-
ment pensions are potentially as important as underfunding government pensions
in reducing national savings.
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National Bureau of Department of Economics
Economic Research
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This paper examines how the availability of annuities affects
savings and inequality in economies in which neither private nor public
pensions initially exist. The absence of widespread market or government
annuity insurance is clearly descriptive of many less developed countries
in the world today; it was also a characteristic of virtually all countries
prior to World War II. While there is now a considerable body of litera-
ture addressing the savings impact of funding or not funding government
pensions (Feldstein (19714), Barro, 19T4), and numerous others), the effect
of the insurance provision per se has received less attention.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) is the first analysis of the pure
insurance effects of social security on national saving. They demonstrate
that when private arrangements are unavailable, the government's provision
of fully funded old age annuities alters household consumption possibili-
ties. In their model in which agents have a bequest motive, the short—run
saving impact of such provision is ambiguous. Hubbard (1983) points out
that this provision unambiguously reduces national saving if agents have no
bequest motive. F\iller descriptions of life cycle (zero bequestmotive)
economies in the absence of annuity insurance are presented in Eckstein,
Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983) and Abel (1983). Both papers independently
derived the stochastic steady state properties of economies in which agents
involuntarily leave bequests to their children. Abel also considers the
effects of introducing a fully funded social security system in such an
economy, his chief finding being that such a policy reducessavings.1
paper reaches a similar conclusion about the savings impact of
perfecting insurance arrangements, although we model the initial,
no—market/government annuity economy quite differently. Abel's research
and that of our oin were conducted independently.-2—
Theassumption entertained by Eckstein et al. and Abel that
cczripletely selfish parents with no interest in their children leave
involuntarybequests to their own children seems rather arbitrary. Clearly
parents have the option to bequeath their wealth to surviving spouses,
friends, other relatives, or charitable organizations. In addition, the
notionthat bequests are completely involuntary seems implausible. An
alternative assumption is that selfish parents and selfish children collec—
tively pool the risks of the parents' date of death in a manner thatis
mutually advantageous.There are three reasons why cooperative (voluntary)
risk pooling seems a more realistic assumption. First, cooperative risk
pooling Pareto dominates noncooperative behavior. Second, as describedin
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the risks of uncertain longevity appear to be
very large; the amount of resources that mildly risk—averse,selfish indi-
viduals would surrender to have access to fair annuity insurance is poten-
tially quite sizeable. This suggests a very substantial demand for market
insurance if selfish parents cannot nake comparable risk pooling arrange-
ments with their children, friends, or other relatives. Third, pooling
longevity risk with even a single child can capture a large fraction of the
gains fran perfect insurance (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)); hence, such
risk pooling with children appears well "worth the trouble," with the gains
far exceeding any reasonable transaction costs.
This paper models cooperative risk pooling of selfish parents and
children taking into account the arrival of future selfish family members,
namely, unborn grandchildren, great grandchildren, great great—3—
grandchildren, etc. At each point in time the anticipated arrivalof additional
agents with whom young family members can share risks influencesthe set of
current risk—sharing arrangements that are of mutual advantage to youngand old
family members. As a consequence the solution to the bargaining problem
between currently living family members takes account of the infinite
sequence of bargains struck by family descendents.
In addition to modeling the process of sequential generational
risk—sharing, we calculate, for the CES utility function, the stochastic
steady state level and distribution of wealth. These calculations suggest
that perfecting annuity insurance can have major impacts on national
savings. For our preferred set of parameter values, the introductionof
perfect annuity insurance reduces wealth by 35 to60 percent in the long
run. The exact percentage reduction in savings within this range depends
on assumptions about the cooperative bargaining solution. These figures
are large, and are larger still if one assus a greater degreeof risk
aver si on.
Given our parameterization of preferences, the 35 to 60 percent
range should, however, be viewed as an upper boundfor the impact of intro-
ducing what amounts to a. fully funded social security system in an econoury
with familyrisksharing. There are two reasons why these figures are
likely to considerably overestimate the actual outcome. First, they are
partial equilibrium estimates, i.e., they do not take accountof potential
changes in factor prices (wages and interest rates) that wild arise,in a
closed econon, from a major reduction in national wealth. Such price—h —
changescan significantly dampen savings reductions in models of this kind.
Second, in order to highlight the impact of insurance provision, we assume
that at most two family members are simultaneously alive. This generates
the smallest possible risk—sharing within families. Obviously, a suf-
ficiently large number of family members is capable of pooling virtually
all risks of uncertain longevity. With large enough families sharing mor-
tality risks, the affect on aggregate wealth of perfecting insurance provi-
sion could be quite small.
Whilethese numbers are partial equilibrium estimates and inten—
tionaliybiased upwards by ourmodeling of family size, they are surpri-
singly large relative to our prior beliefs. They suggest that the
insurance aspects of social security are potentially as important in
altering national savings as is the riethod of social security finance. lit
is also worth pointing out that the transition to the full annuity
insurance equilibrium is completed once the inital generation of young
family members reach old age. In real time, this is hO to 50 years, but
one would expect tosee most of the ultimate change in savings occuring
within the first 20 years. A final point that aids in evaluating these
findings is that full insurance, while generating a Pareto efficient steady
state, may involve a steady state level of welfare that is lower than the
minimum level of welfare in the family insurance stochastic steady state.
This somewhat paradoxical result is explained as follows; the provision of
full insurance transfers resources to the first cohort of elderly at the
expense of initial young and future generations. While the new steady—5—
stateis efficient, it has a smaller stock of resources, in this case capi-
tal, because of the initial transfer. This transfer to the initial elderly
is not effected by explicit redistribution across age groups. It arises
more subtly, namely, from the inability of young family members to continue
selling insurance to their parents in exchange for their parents' potential
bequests. Rather than bargain at less than fair insurance terms with
children, provision of perfect annuities, which involves each cohort
pooling risk with its c'in members, permits the initial generation of
elderly to consume at a higher rate. The initial set of children as well
as all future generations are better off because of the perfection of the
insurance market, but worse off because they no longer receive inheritan-
ces. Since all children in this paper are born with identical endowments,
eliminating inheritances by providing perfect insurance also eliminates
inequality.
The next section presents the infinite horizon bargaining model;
the zero bargaining, involuntary bequests model is also presented for pur-
poses of comparison. This section also describes the algorithmused to
solve the bargaining problem. Section III discusses the process of wealth
transmission in the stochastic steady state. Section IV compares long—run
stocks of wealth under (1) perfect annuity markets, (2) three alternative
parent—child bargaining solutions, and (3) nc—insurance arrangements with
involuntary transfers made to children. This section also considers how
the presence of additional children would alter the findings. Section V
sumnarizes the paper and discusses ideas for additional research.—6—
II.The Model
As a prelude to presenting the selfish family, infinite horizon
bargaining problem, this section briefly reviews wealth accumulation under
perfect annuitymarkets. In the subsequent modeling of family risk
sharing,each selfish parent reaches a bargain with a single selfish child
regardingthe risk of long life. This is the simplest of familystruc-
tures, but the associated intergenerational bargaining problem remains
moderately complicated. The final part of this section describes how our
stylized econosr operates when family bequest-annuity aggreements do not
exist, but where involuntary bequests are made to children as in Eckstein,
et. al. (1981) and Abel (1983). In this case it is everyone for himself;
that is, there are no risk pooling opportunites to ameliorate the risk of
long life.
In canparing the econonor under these three insurance arrangements
——perfectinsurance, self insurance between parent and child, and no
insurance ——itis important to distinguish between transition effects and
steady state comparisons. Clearly, if we move from no insurance to a
family deal or from a family bargain to perfect insurance, the first
generation ins. These gains are due to the fact that the generation
alive during the switch received an inheritance from its parent, but gives
none or one of smaller expected value to its children. Kotlikoff and
Spivak (1981) estimated that these gains to the first generation could be
very substantial. For instance, consider a completely selfish 55 year old
male who gains no pleasure from leaving bequests and whose time separable—7—
consumptionpreferences are isoelastic, with a relative risk aversion coef-
ficient of .75.Thisindividual would consider the introduction of a per-
fect annuities market equivalent to an increase in his (her) wealth of1Vf
percent; with perfect annuities, there is no need to maintain precautionary
balances to provide for an extraordinarily long life, and the individual
can, therefore, enjoy a higher consumption stream forthe remainder of his
(her) life. The gains to those who first get access to a perfect annuities
market increase with the age and degree of risk aversion of the individual.
For uninsured individuals the gains to deals within the family are also
large. With two participants the gain is roughly half thatoffered by per-
fect insurance, and with three it is roughly 70 percent as great. Hence,
one would also expect significant start up gains in moving from zero to
family insurance.
This paper, in contrast to Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), con-
centrates on steady state comparisons of the three insurance environments.
In the case of family insurance we look at situations where a parent is
insuring with a child, and the child later makes a deal with his child and
so on. The analysis of aggregate wealth requires considerationof the
entire family history of insurance arrangements and mortality experience.
Obviously, the consumption and saving of current family memhers depends on
their inherited wealth which depends on the sequence of wealth and death
dates of all previous ancestors.
There are four periods of life in this model. People live with
certainty for the first three periods and survive to the fourth with proba——8—
bilityP. So, the fraction (i—F) of the population live only three
periods, while P live 14 periods. Children are one whentheir parents are
three. Any negotiation or deal, explicit or implicit, between parentand
child takes place before the parent and child engage in their respective
third and first period consumption.
Individualsare exogenously endowed with earnings. The time pat-
tern of the receipt of these earnings greatly influences saving andwealth
in the economy. We assume that no earnings are received in the fourth
period of life and examine a number of patterns of income receiptin the
firstthree periods. Consumers are modelled as nnximizing expected life-
time utility subject to one or more budget constaints. Utility istaken as
separable in consumption (Ct) over time.
The perfect annuities case is by far the simplest to analyze
since an individual's choice problem is separate from that of his parents
and children. In this case each individual at age one nnximizes
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where is the probability of surviving to period t (P1rP2P31, and
o <
P14<1),Ct is consumption in period t, R is thediscount factor (one
divided by one plus the interest rate), a is the pure time discount factor,
and W1 is the present value of earnings. Throughout this paper we use the—9—
isoelasticform for
l—y
(2) u(c )=— t l—y -
wherel—y is the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. The
parameter y measures the (constant) degree of relative risk aversion.
The solution to the consumer's problem in the case of perfect
annuities takes the form
w (R)(t_1)T
(3) c = 1____— t
J=l
Knowing C. and the time pattern of earnings one can derive the accumulated
wealthof each cohort.Total wealth in the economy equals the sum of each
cohort's wealth holdings.
The family insurance solution where each member acts solely out
of self interest is much more complicated. When the bargaining takes place
the parent is age three with one more period of certain life followed by
one period of uncertain life. The agreement reached by parent and
child can be thought of astheparent buying an annuity from the child. In
return for some money in period 3(theprice of the annuity) the child pro-
mises to offer a specified level of support for the parent in period 14 in
the event that the parent lives that long. Equivalently, the deal can be
arranged such that the child gives the parent some money before period 3 in
return for being made beneficiary of the will of the parent. The equiva——10—
lence can be seen in the following example which assumes a zero rate of
interest for simplicity: say the parent pays $1 for an annuity that gives
him $2 in period 1 of his life should he live. In the equivalent support—
for—bequest arrangement the child gives the parent $1 in period 3 in return
for the parent's agreeing to save $2 for this fourth period, and rakes the
child his beneficiary should he die at the end of period 3. In both of
these arrangements the child rakes a net transfer of $1 to the parent if
the parent lives to old age and receives $1 if the parent does not.
Regardless of how the bargain is explicitly or implicitly specified the
parent and child share the risk of the parent's lifespan. Perhaps the
simplest way to think about these deals is the first way, the purchase of
annuity insurance by the parent from the child. The next issue to address
is what is the price of this insurance.
Both the parent and the child can be made better off by striking
a bargain. However, there is some indeterminacy as to how the surplus will
be divided. One can imagine the price of the annuity being set suf-
ficiently high that the parent's utility is just the same as if no deal had
been struck, and, therefore, all of the gains from trade go to the child.
At some low price, all of the gains from trade would go to the parent. An
additional complication is that the child, in striking an arrangement with
the parent, considers the 3rd period bargain he will make with his
own child. The expected utility from that future bargain is
denoted V and depends on the child's level of third period wealth,
i.e., V =v(w3).
Throughout the paper we assume that successive children
all earn identical amounts with certainty in the first three periods of their—11—
lives. Hence, the resources of the grandchild, with whom the child will
bargain, is supressed as an argument of V.
The frontier of the utility possibilities space with intergenera-
























where Cf3 and Cf are the parent's certain and contingent consumption in
periods 3 and 14, respectively; C1 is the child's first period consumption,
and 0s2,a and C52d are the child's second period consumption contingent
upon the parent being alive or dead in period 14,respectively.The child's cer-
tain present value of resources is W51, and his (her) parent's third period
wealth is W .Finally,W and W are the third period levels of wealth f3 s3,a s3,d
of the child, that he or she uses in bargaining with the grandchild, contingent
upon the parent being alive or dead in period tt.—12—
Problem (14) involves rraximizing a weighted sum of the two
participants' expected utility where the weight 0, applied to the child's
utility, potentially ranges from 0 to w.Thechild considers his consump-
tion in periods 3 and 4 under two eventualities: either his parent dies
early, and he, therefore, does not have to pay off on the annuity insurance
agreement (this is reflected in the final term of (14) which is weighted by
the (1—P) possibility of its occurrence), or the parent dies late and,
hence, the child does have to pay off on the annuity insurance (the fourth
term in (4) ).Asstated, the v(w) function gives the expected utility the
child experiences from his third and fourth period consumption discounted
to period 3 of his life as a function of his wealth in period 3.
Problem (14) has two budget constraints because total consumption
plus savings for the child's third period equals total initial wealth of
the parent and child under both lifetime possibilities for the parent. The
weight 0 reflects the terms of trade in this bargaining problem. In
general one would expect 0 to be a function of the resources of both the
parent and the child, Wf3 and W1, respectively. However, since w51 is
constant in our analysis, we express 0 =0(Wf3).
Solving problem (4) for different values of 0 traces out the uti-
lity possibility frontier for family deals shown in Figure 1. Obviously,
not all values of 0 will generate outcomes that are in the core. We have
labeled as O the critical value for 0 for which the parent receives none
of the gains from trade (i.e., the child receives all gains from trade).















The point T is the threat point, indicating the parent's and child's
expected utility levels if they fail to bargain with each other. As is
clear from problem (Ii), figure 1 depends on the respective resources of the
father and the son, W51 and Wf3 and on the function V( .).
Sincewe consider a stationary environment in which tastes and
endowments of children remain unchanged, we will limit outseif to sta-
tionary bargaining solutions. That is, we assume that the V function dll
be the same for the bargaining of each successive pair of generations. An
implication of stationarity is that the parent's expected utility in 4)
expressedas a function of his wealth, Wf3, equals the child's expected
utility function, V, when the child becomes a father. An immediate property
of stationarity is that the child reaches the same deal with his child as
his parent did dth him if respective resources are the same. More
formal1r, a stationary solution is defined as a bargaining function O(W3)
and an expected utility function v(w) such that if Cf, Cf are optimal
values of consumption derived from solving problem (4),where
v(w3) is substituted for v(w3), then V(Wf3) = + aPT
Solvingproblem V4) involves searching for a fixed point
function V and an associated B(Wf3)functionthat produces outcomes that
are in the core. We consider and compute three solutions to problem (n).
Inthe first solution, denoted O, the child receives all the gainsfrom
trade;furthermore, all successive bargains involvechildren receiving all
gainsfrom trade. In the second, O. solution, the initial and all suc-
cessive fathers receive all gains from trade. In the third solution the—1i—
gains from trade are always divided between child and son according to John
Nash's (l951) two person bargaining solution.
In the 0 solution parents receive their threat point level of
expected utility. This is the expected utility received by the parent if





The structure of the problem is very much like that with perfect annuities,
except that providing for Cf costs R instead of only PR. The advantage of
annuity markets is precisely this reduced cost of consumption in periods
where survival is uncertain. Denote VS(Wf3) as the maximum utility that
the parent with wealth Wf3 can achieve on his own by solving (5).V5(Wf3)






Naturally,V$(Wf3) is the minimum the parent is willing to accept in
an annuity bargain with his child. V5 is also the expected utility func-
tion of the child in the Os bargain with his own child. Replacing V for V—15—
in (14) and choosing 0 for each value of W such that V (w) + p
$ f3 s f3 l— l—y
provides a proof byconstruction that V is a fixed point function for the
Os problem. In addition the computed values of O for different values
of W13 determine the function 0(W13). Whileparents,in this O bargain,
receive their threat pointlevelsof expected utility, their actual pattern
of consuiition differs from what they would choose on their own.As
described below, C3 is snller and greater than the respective
solution values to problem (5).
Althou the V5 function wasobtainedanalytically, this is
not generally possible. For the the oand Nash(denoted e)solutionsan
iterative technique described below is used to find fixed point func-
tions and their associated 0 functions. Both the O and 0 solutions
require specifyingthechild's threat point. Given ourassumptionof a
cooperative, efficient solution to father/son bargaining, the child, if'he
fails to bargain with his father, can credibly assert to his father that he
will be able to reach a deal with his child. The child's threat point EUT,
is the solution to problem (6); it involves the child's consuming C1 and C52
in his first two periods, respectively, and bargaining with his child
in period 3 based on third period wealth, W53.
Maximize:




subjecttoIn the case of bargaining, V is replaced by Vf in (6) as well
as (14). The solution proceeds by first guessing a function Vf. Next
we solve (6) to determine the son's threat point utility EXJT. Given the
guess of Vf and the derived value of E&, B is choosen in (14) such that
the son's expected utility in the solution to (14) equals EUT. This
last calculation is repeated for different values of Wf3 thereby
generating a function Gf(Wc). In addition to computing a Bf function
based on the initial guess of Vf, the solution to (14) based on Of(Wf3)
determines the father's expected utility in the bargain. The maximizing
c*l1 c*tT
values of +Pa for different values of Wf3 provide an expected
utility function for the parent in his O bargain with his child. This
function is used as the next guess of the Vf function, and the calculations
are repeated. The iteration proceeds until the guess of the Vf function
equals the father's expected utility as a function of Wf3, i.e., until
we have found a function Vf. which is a fixed point of the mapping described.
In the Nash bargaining case a very similar solution technique
is applied. The Nash solution involves choosing B in (14) to maximize
the quantity (Jf -EU)(EU
—EUT),where and EU are the expected
utilities obtained by the parent and child respectively, and equals
V, the parent's threat point. To find V, the Nash fixed point function,
,T we again choose an initial guess of V and solve (6) to find EU. We
C +RC +R2W W
sl s2 s3 sl—1T-
also solve (5) to find EU. Next the guessed value of V is substituted
for V in (14), and 8 is choosen to maximize (EUf —E)(EU5
—
Repeatingthis last step for alternative values of generates a
function On(Wf3) as well as an expected utility function of the father arising
from Nash bargaining. This latter function is used as the second guess
ofthe V function. The iteration continues until we find a fixed point
function V. In this bargaining solution as in the previous
Os solution, the Of(Wf3) and O(W3) functionscalculated in the last
round of the iteration correspond to the correct bargaining functions for
the functions V and V, respectively.
The V function is used as the initial guess of the V function
for the O. and Nash bargaining solutions. In each iteration we computed
the solution to (14) for 80 different values of Wf3. We then fit a fifth
order polynominal in Wf3 to these points and used the resulting regression
as theguess of V in the next iteration. The iterative procedure for
determining V converged roughly by the 8th iteration; 12 iterations each
were used for theand Nash cases. "rough convergence" we mean that
economicchoice variables wereidentical to at least the second digit
betweeniterations. For a range of intermediate values of Wf3 the calcu-
lated consumption termsareidentical to five digits between iterations.
While we believe moreaccurate values of' the V and V functions could be
obtained,the computation costs of achieving the additional accuracy is
considerable; solving V4) for anyoneof the 80valuesofWf3 in any one of'
the 12iterations requires rather extensive computation.—18—
TheInvoluntary Bequest Model
The next case we examine is the situation with no insurance
arrangements, but unintentional bequests are made to children. This case
has been examined in two period models by Eckstein et al. (1983) and Abel
(1983). The solution differs from that of the threat points because the
child inherits unspent money of the parent. The child in period 1 of his
life can observe the wealth of his parent and can calculate the potential
inheritance, I, he will receive should his parent die young. The child is
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C +RC =W +1,
sl s2,d s3,d sl




The child maximizes his welfare subject to the certain earnings endowment,
and the inheritance I left by the parent if he dies young. The—19—
function gives the level of expected utility the child can receive in
periods 3 andwith no deal with his child, i.e., the solution to problem
(5) above.
III. The Transmission of Wealth in the Stochastic Steady State
Figure 2 graphs the wealth of children in their third period
(when they are parents) against their parents' wealth, Wf3 for the case of
family insurance bargains. The amount of wealth the child brings
into his third period depends, of course, on the age at which his
parent dies. The curves Wd3(w3) and w3(w3) indicate the third
period wealth of the child if his own parent lives for three periods
and four periods, respectively. Note that the two curves intersect
on the vertical axis, since a child whose parent has no wealth engages in
the same consumption regardless of the date of his parent's death.
Theexact position and shapes of these curves depend on the spe-
cificationof the utilityfunction as well as the parent—child bargaining
solution.For the examples we describe here, the curves were constructed
byfitting fifth order polynominals to the values of W3(Wf3)and W3(Wf3)
calculated for 80 different values of W3. The intercepts in each
regression were constrained to equal the amount of resources a child would
save for period 3 assuming he engages in no bargain with his parent. In
each calculation, the estirrated curveswere essentially straightlines,
with
Wd3(Wf3)and Wa3(Wf3) monotonically increasing and decreasing in Wf3,
respectively.
Intuitively, Wd3(Wf3) rises with Wf3 because a fraction of the

























fourth period consumption, C,4. If the parent dies after period 3, the
additional Cf is passed onto the child. For the child the inheritance is
allocated to larger second period consumption as well as larger third
period savings, W3(Wf3), that is used in the bargain with his own child.
The decline in t3(Wf3) as Wf3 increases is explained as follows:
regardless of the bargaining solution between the parent and child, the
parent's contingent bequest rises with Wf3. Part of the price the child
pays for the larger contingent bequest is somewhat lowervalues of second
period consumption and third period wealth in the case the parent doesnot
die young. This permits the parent to consume sore in period 3 and, poten—
tial]y,inperiod 4.
Assuming,as is verified in our actual calculation, that the
slope of Wd3(Wf3) is everywhere positive and less than unity, Wf3max is the
unique limiting value of a parent's third period wealth when all his fore-
fathers have died early. For values of Wf3 above Wf3max successive early
deaths of parents leads to smaller values of Wf3 for each successive parent
until the sequence converges to Wf3max Similarly, starting with a
value for Wf3 below Wf3max and assuming that all successive parents die
earlyleadsto successively larger values of Wf3 until Wf3max is reached.
Wenext turn to the minimum bound on the stochastic steady state
distribution of a parent's wealth. If the slope of 3(Wf3) is between 0
and —1, which is the case in the examples presented below, then W13 is the
unique limit of the value of a parent'swealth as successive parents in a
familycontinue to live through period four. In this case, the sequence of
Wf3s, starting at any particular value, converges as a"Cobb—web" to W3;—21—
i.e.,each successive parent with more wealth than Wf3, who lives to period
four, has a child who has less than W1,3 when the child becomes a parent.
In the stochastic steady state W is the lower bound on a
f3min
parent's third period wealth. Values below W13. cannot arise in the
stochastic steady state; any parent with Wf3 below Wf3mifl will have a child
whose wealth as a parent is between Wf3mifl and Wf3max Once the Wf3 for a
particular family falls within Wf3mifl and Wf3max no parent in the family
will ever appear with wealth outside this range. Values of Wf3 below
Wf3mifland above Wf3max are nonrecurrent states inthe Markoff process that
maps Wf3 into W3(W3) with probability 1—p and into W3(w3) with probabi-
lity p. As can readily be seen by tracing out alternative p and(1—p)
sequences, starting with values of between Wf3min and Wf3rnx the larger
the value of Wf in the preceding generation,the smaller will be the Wf3 in
thenext generation if the parent dies late. Wf3mifl, therefore,
corresponds to the value of 3(Wf3) for Wf3max i.e., Wf3min =
Hence,iftherichest parent survives to period 4,hischild
isthepoorest parent when he reaches period 3.Thisextreme "riches to
rags" result is quite intuitive. A parent with the largest possible
vealth, providesthe largest estate if he dies early, but no estate
if he dies late. In order to "purchase" the right to this largest poten-
tial estate the child pays the largest price in terms of reduced consump-
tion and third period wealth ifhisparent lives.
Since the Markov process described in Figure 2is nonrecurrent
there are large regions between Wf3min and Wf3max that have zero—22—
mass with respect to the steady statedistribution of wealth. The
shaded areas in Figure 2 chart this distribution forthe case Os in which
parents receive none of the gains from bargainingwith their children.
This distribution was constructed by giving onehundred thousand families
the same initial value of Wf3 and then simulating 25 successive generations
using a .6probabilityof a four period lifetime. The distribution of
Wf3 stablized after rcighly8generationS.Since we assume that a new
generationis born every period, rather than every other period,there are
also orphaned two—year old children as well as two—yearold children with
surviving parents who hold wealth at any point intime. Calculating the
stochastic steady state's stock of wealth requires simply sununingthe
wealth holdings of all age 3 parents, the wealth of orphaned children,and
the wealth of two—year old children and their surviving four—yearold
parents. The wealth holdings of these lattertwo groups are derived from
the distribution of wealth holdings of three-year old parents;the consump—
tion of each of the 100,000 parents and their children,when these parents
are age 3, is subtracted from the income ofthese families to compute their
combined saving. This saving plus each parent's initialwealth represents
the next period wealth holdings of families consistingof either orphaned
children or of children withsurvivingparents. Since this wealth distri-
bution is stationary in the stochastic steady state, next period'swealth
holdings of these groups is identical to this period'swealth holdingsof
such groups. Similar calculations are made for the casein which there are
noinsurancebargains between parents and children, but childrennoriethe——23—
lessinherit their parentst estates.
Parameter values were chosen as follows; the time preference
factor, a, and the disccint factor, R, both equal .86. The coefficient of
risk aversion, y, equals 1, andthefourth period suvival probability, p,
equals .6. If one thinks of each period as consisting of 15 years, then a
discount factor of .86 corresponds to a 1 percent annual real rate of
return. In addition, if we view parents as being age 50 and children age
20 when the bargains are struck, the .6 fourth period survival probability
is roulyequivalentto assuming an expected age of death of Th.
Table1presents the calculated values for a parent's third and
fourth period consumption at alternative levels of Wf3 under perfect
insurance, the three alternative parent—child bargains (the Nash,and Os
solutions to (6)), and the case of no—insurance arrangements.Ineach of
these cases, the parent's consumption increases with his third period
wealth. Access to perfect insurance results, for this parameterization of'
utility, in higher levels of consumption for the parent in both periods 3
and 14 relative to the other cases of partial or zero insurance. For
example, if the parent's wealth is 14.14 at the beginning of' period 3, he
consurrs 2.9 and 2.5 in periods 3 and 14, respectively, with no insurance,
and 3.14 in both periods with perfect insurance. The present value dif-
ference in these consumption paths is 25 percent.
A parent—and—child bargain in which successive parents receive
all gains from trade with successive children, the O bargain, provides

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and zero insurance. Consumption values for the parent under the Nash
bargaining solution lie between the O. and O deals. This is the expected
result since the Nash solution divides the gains frcn trade between parents
and children. The Os bargain, in which the parent receives no benefits
from dealing with his child, involves slightly less third period consump-
tion and slightly more fourth period consumption when old than in the case
of zero insurance.
Table 2 shows consumption and third period wealth values of
children in different insurance regimes. Under perfect insurance the
child's consumption is 3.1 in each period; with no insurance arrangements
and no involuntary bequests the child consumes 3.2 during the first three
periods and 2.8 in the last period. Depending on the parent's wealth and
longevity and the bargain struck between the two, the child can potentially
consume well in excess of the perfect insurance values. As an example,
takethe case of a parent with wealth of 6.owhoagrees to a O bargain
with his child. The child's first period consumption is 3,1t, thesame as
underperfect insurance. If the parent dies after his third period, the
child consumes 4.5 in period 2 rather than 3)4, the perfect insurance
amount. Furthermore, the child's third period wealth in this case is 7.9,
substantiallyin excess of the third period wealth of a son under per—
fectinsurance. With third period wealth of 1.9,thechild's third and
contingent fourth period consumption values are, from Table 1, roughly5.5
and4.9. For this child the total potential realized present value of con-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV. The Savins Impact of Alternative Insurance Arrangements
Table 3 compares steady state per capita wealth stocks in the
different insurance regimes under alternative assumptions about age ear-
nings profiles. Each of the age earnings profiles has a present value of
10, which is received with certainty over the course of the first three
periods. Since the child's resources are identical in each of these cases,
the consumption decisions of the child and parent are the same for each of
these earnings paths. Hence, the difference in stocks of wealth by row in
Table 3 are simply a function of the timing of the receipt of labor income.
The absolute size of these economies' wealth stocks may appear
small in comparison to the level of earnings or income in a particular
period. However, such stock—flow ratios must be adjusted for the fact that
flows in this model are received over a period that corresponds to roughly
15 years. In the case of the third and probably the nnst realistic ear-
nings profile in Table 3, the ratio of wealth to one—fifteenth of a
period's labor earnings is 6.9 in the case of the O bargain.A wealth—to—
earningsratio of 6.9 is somewhat greater than that observed in the United
States.
The percentage reductions in wealth from civing to perfect
insurance reported in Table 3 are verylarge.For the earnings profile in
the third row the long—run wealth reduction is 59 percent starting from the
0 (children take all) stochastic steady state. It is tl percent in the
case of an initial Nash bargaining equalibrium and 35 percent when the ini-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The values in Table 3 are highly sensitive to the shape of the
age earnings profile. The smallest percentage wealth reduction arises when
all earnings are received in the first period; in this case wealth falls
20.1 percent starting from the 0 bargain and by 13.9 percent starting from
the O. bargain.
The percentage change in wealth appears relatively insensitive to
variations in the degree of relative risk aversion, y. For example,
reducing yfrom4 to 1.5 lowers the percentage decline in wealth under row
3's earnings profile and initial Os bargaining from 59.3 percent to 50.1
percent. Raising y to 8 increases the value to 63.2 percent. Under Table
3's first age earnings profile the percentage wealth reductions starting
from economies are 15.1, 20.1, and 22.9 for values of y equal to 1.5, 4,
and 8, respectively.
There is considerably more sensitivity to changes in the fourth
period survival probability P; however, the sensitivity depends on the
choice of earnings profile. For example, lower P from .6 to .3, which
reduces the expected age of death from roughly i to roughly 69, converts
the 59.3 percent Os reduction (row 3, Table 3) to 83.6 percent. The same
reduction in P raises Table 3's row 1, O value from 20.1 percent to only
percent.
The large differences in wealth stocks between the perfect
insurance and family insurance regimes suggests that steady state welfare
could actually be lower inthecase of perfect insurance. This is indeed
possible. Under (children take all) bargaining and assuming y equals—2T —
1.5,the expected utility of even the child of the poorest parent exceeds
the uniform, steady state expected utility under perfect insurance.
Starting frcm a situation of zero insurance, achieving the perfect
insurance expected utility level requires a 7 percent increase in
resources; achieving the expected utility of the child with the poorest
parent in the stochasic steady state requires an 8 percent increase in
life—time resources, starting from this benchmark regime. Attaining the
level of welfare of the child whose parent in the esteadystate has the
maximum potential wealth, Wf3max requires a corresponding 12 percent
increase in resources.
Thesteady state stocks of wealth in the case of no family
arrangements, but involuntary bequests to children are slightly smaller
than those under O bargaining. This is not surprising since in both cases
parents receive their threat point levels of utility, and, consume roughly
similaramounts. In the Bdeal, however, the child's insurance provision
leads to a somewhat lcMer level of the parent's consumption in period 3 and
a somewhat higher level in period 14 (see Table 1). In addition, given Wf3,
thechild consumes slightly less in period 1 in the deal than in the
involuntarybequestsetting. This consumption pattern explains the larger
wealthstock in theinsurance regieme.
Another question raised by Table 3 is the extent to which imper-
fections in annuity markets can fully explain observed intergenerational
transfers. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) invoked the assumption of perfect
insurance arrangements in estimating that roughly 80 percent of private—28—
U.S.wealth corresponds to accumulated inheritances of those currently
alive. This assumption that annuity insurance is fairly well developedin
the United States can be defended pointing to social security and other
government annuities, private pensions, old age labor earningsthat are
partly contingent on survival, and the potential for familyrisk sharing
involving multiple members. Still, it is interesting to ask howtheir
calculation turns out when it is applied to the two member family insurance
econonry described above. Their techniqueinvolves subtracting accumulated
consumptionfran accumulated earnings for each cohort and then summing
across cohorts to get a total wealth stock. Thist?life cycle" wealth is
thencanpared with actual wealth holdings. If agents in the economy are
selfish and annuity arrangements are perfect or very close to perfect, coin—
puted and actual aggregate wealth will be identical or extremelyclose to
one another.
The two person family regime is, however, quite far from that of
perfect insurance. As described here, this imperfection producesa
stochastic steady state in which observed consumption profiles oftenexceed
what could be financed from one's own labor earnings even under perfect
insurance. Hence, in this economy, subtracting, for all cohorts, accumu—
lated consuiition, part of which is financed bypastintergenerational
transfers,from accumulated earnings producesan underestimate of the
economy' actual wealth. For the 0 bargain, with 'equalsand with Table
3's row3earnings profile, 1.5, the underestimate is close to 90 percent
ofactual wealth. Since Kotlikoff and Summers' calculation understates—29—
U.S. wealth by 80percent,imperfections in annuity markets appear poten—
tial],y capableof fullyexplainingactual U.S. intergenerational
transfers.
V. Conclusion
The preceeding calculation as well as the figures presented in
table 3 must be viewed cautiously. They imbed rather extreme assumptions
concerning the size of the risk sharing pool and, in the O case, the
nature of risk sharing. A more realistic model would contain two parents
pooling risk with two or more children. Since the parents, by themselves,
can provide each other with considerable insurance protection, their threat
point values of expected utility are greater in collective bargaining with
their children. As a consequence one would expect parents, in such a
model, to have an expected utility level considerably greater than that
described by the solution. In addition, if they can extract most of the
gains from trade from dealing with their children, they will end up with
close to perfect insurance. In that case the impact of improvingannuity
arrangementson savings would be minor.
Extending the analysis to different configurations of families
is an area for future research. To date we have considered the simplest
case of multiple children dealing with a single parent under the
B bargain. For table 3's third earnings profile the percentage reduction
in wealth is quite similar to the 50 percent figure in table 3 over a range
of children numbering as great as 5perparent. Since their earnings pro-
fileimplies verylittlesaving in period one, the change in the earnings'—30—
age structure fran a 1 to 5ratioof children to parents has little impact
on accumulated earnings of particular cohorts at a point in time. In addi-
tion, the consumption patterns of children and the parent are not greatly
altered in moving from 1 to 5childrenunder the O bargain. This would
not, of cairse, be the case in the ebargain.A O bargain with 5
childrenwould provide parents with close to the consumption levels
available with perfect insurance.
While the findings should be viewed cautiously they do suggest
thatthe manner in which annuity markets function can significantly affect
saving, wealth, andwelfarein an economy. That each generation has large
incentivesto improve annuity arrangements was demonstrated in Kotlikoff
and Spivak (1981). Here we find that the steady state welfare gains are
significantly smaller and, in fact, may be negative. The first
generations' gain results in a smaller inheritance and capital stock for
future generations. This lower wealth maymorethan offset the welfare
gainsthat each generation receives from the availability of long—life
insurance.
We slTould re—emphasize that we are addressing a different question
from that of Felftstein (19Th) and others who are largely concerned with the
funding status of social security. While that line of research attempts to
estimatethe substitutability of social security wealth for private capital, we
are here concerned with the insurance aspects of pensions and social security.
It is our feeling, buttressed by the results of this paper, that a considerable
amountof saving is potentially done for what ccxxld be Joosely termed pre——31—
cautionarymotives. In addition, the exact manner in which families selfinsure
can have major consequences for wealthaccumulation. When nire perfect
insurance policies are made available, whether funded or not,less aggregate
saving occurs. While we have focused on annuity insurance,the paper's findings
suggest that the availability of unemployment insurance, disabilityinsurance,
andhealthinsurance could also significantly affect national saving. In addi-
tion, the government's pooling of human capital risks through progressiveincome
taxation may also be having a major impact. In general, the studyof savings
andgovernmentinsurance provision is an important area for additional
research.WORKING PAPER //1250
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